Myasishchev Mischief: The Bison and the Bomber Gap

Barely a few years since the end of the Second World War, tensions are mounting between former allies as the United States and Soviet Union became increasingly distrustful of one another. The showdown between democracy and communism is beginning all across the globe as the Soviets expand their sphere of influence across eastern Europe and into Asia. With the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949, the United States was on a higher state of alert in dealing with the Soviet Union. As the United States conducted the first test flight of the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strategic bomber in 1952, the Soviet Union responded by developing their own jet powered bomber designed to carry a destructive payload from the Soviet Union deep into the heart of North America. At the time, the only heavy bomber available to the Soviet Air Force was the Tupelov Tu-4 Bull which was a reverse engineered copy of the American B-29 Superfortress but the piston powered bomber was too slow for Soviet leaders who wanted a bomber propelled by jet engines to carry bombs into the United States. The task of designing and fielding such a bomber fell upon the Myasishchev Design Bureau. 

The Soviet design first took to the air in 1953 before being revealed to the public on May Day 1954, when the Myasishchev M-4 Molot or 'Hammer' flew over Moscow's Red Square. The existence of such an aircraft in the Soviet arsenal took the United States by surprise, completely unaware that the Soviets had been developing a jet bomber. The jet bomber was given the NATO reporting code of 'Bison' following the alliance's practice of issuing names to Soviet aircraft corresponding with the type of aircraft being identified. In July 1955, American observers saw 28 Bison bombers flying in two groups during a Soviet airshow at Tushino near northwestern Moscow. The United States government came to believe that the bomber had been placed in mass production for the Soviet Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that 800 Bisons would be on ready alert by the beginning of 1960. 

On 15 February 1954, aviation publication Aviation Week printed an article describing a new Soviet jet bomber capable of carrying a nuclear bomb to the United States mainland from their bases in deep in Soviet Russia. The aircraft they referred to was the Myasishchev M-4 Bison. Over the next year and a half these rumors were debated publicly in the press, and soon after in the United States Congress. Adding to the concerns was an infamous event in July 1955. At the Soviet Aviation Day demonstrations at the Tushino Airfield, ten Bison bombers were flown past the reviewing stand, then flew out of sight, quickly turned around, and flew past the stands again with eight more, presenting the illusion that there were 28 aircraft in the flyby. An elaborate deception formulated by Soviet military planners.

Western analysts calculated from the illusionary force of 28 aircraft, judged that by 1960 the Soviets would have 800. The classified estimates however, led American politicians to warn of a "bomber gap". The "bomber gap" was a term to define a belief that the Soviet Union had gained a strategic advantage in deploying jet-powered strategic bombers that were capable of attacking the United States. The concept was widely accepted for several years, and was used as a political talking point in order to justify a great increase in American defense spending. At the time, the USAF had just introduced its own strategic jet bomber, the B-52 Stratofortress, and the shorter ranged B-47 Stratojet which was still suffering from a variety of technical problems that limited its combat availability. USAF staff started pressing for accelerated production of the larger B-52 Stratofortress, but it also grudgingly accepted calls for expanded air defense.The Air Force was generally critical of spending effort on defense, having studied the results of the World War II bombing campaigns and concluding that Stanley Baldwin's pre-war thinking on the fruitlessness of air defense was correct: the bomber almost always did get through. Like the British, they concluded that money would better be spent on making the offensive arm larger, deterring an attack. The result was a production series consisting of thousands of aircraft. Over 2,000 B-47s and almost 750 B-52s were built to match the imagined fleet of Soviet aircraft.

U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was skeptical of the perceived bomber gap idea from its inception. With no evidence to prove or disprove the logic, he agreed to the development of the Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady high altitude reconnaissance aircraft to provide an answer to the lingering question . The first U-2 flights started in 1956. On one early mission known as Mission 2020 flown by Martin Knutson on 4 July 1956, a U-2 flew over Engels airfield near Saratov and photographed 20 M-4 Bison bombers on the ramp. Multiplying by the number of Soviet bomber bases known to exist, the intelligence suggested the Soviets were already well on their way to deploying hundreds of aircraft. Ironically, the U-2 had actually photographed the entire Bison fleet; there wasn't a single bomber at any of the other bases. Similar missions over the next year finally demonstrated this beyond a doubt, and at least in official circles that the gap had been disproven. It was later learned that the Soviet Bison was unable to meet its original range goals and was limited to a range of roughly about 8,000 km. Unlike the United States, at that time the Soviets lacked overseas bases in the Western Hemisphere and therefore the M-4 would not be able to attack the US mainland and return to land at a friendly airbase. 

In the end it was not the Soviet Air Force (VVS) that wanted the Bison, but rather Naval Aviation (AV-MF). Though it could still not bomb Washington, D.C., the Bison had a sufficient range to fulfill the need for a long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft. In 1959, the 3M variant broke numerous world records; however, it was thought by the West (and would continue to be thought so until 1961) that the 3M variant was the original M-4, meaning that the capability of the M-4 was vastly overestimated by Western intelligence agencies.Interest in the Myasishchev Bison waned, and a total of only 93 were produced before production of the bomber ceased in 1963. The vast majority of these were modified for used as tankers or maritime reconnaissance aircraft; only the original 10 shown at the air show and nine newer 3MD13 models served on nuclear alert with the Soviet bomber force.

Neither the M-4 nor the 3M ever saw combat service, and none were ever modified for low altitude penetration attack, as the American B-52 Stratofortresses were. No Bisons were ever exported to the Soviet Union's allies. The last aircraft, an M-4-2 fuel tanker, was withdrawn from service in 1994.

So the legacy of the Bison was largely preserved in the aftermath of the bomber gap controversy which through American miscalculations resulted in a massive buildup of the United States Air Force's strategic bomber fleet, which peaked at over 2,500 strategic bombers to counter the perceived Soviet threat. Realizing that the mere belief in the gap was an extremely effective funding source, a series of similarly nonexistent Soviet military advances were constructed in the following years of the Cold War in a tactic now known as "policy by press release." Other deceptions included claims of a nuclear-powered bomber, supersonic VTOL flying saucers, and ultimately only a few years after the "bomber gap" came a "missile gap."

Penetrating the Blockade: How Operation Vittles sustained an encircled City

The year was 1945, Berlin much like the rest of Germany lay in a state of ruin. Her streets and buildings were pockmarked with the graffiti of war. Shell craters, smashed windows and twisted figures of stone, mortar and steel littered the streets stretching towards the sky like some grotesque carcass reaching to achieve a final grasp. Adolf Hitler, the leader of the defeated nation was dead, committing suicide to escape the western Allies held bent on bringing him and his legion of cronies to justice for the crimes they had committed over the span of some twelve years. The nation was in a state of dispair facing an uncertain future as foreign forces occupied the wartorn land. As per the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences earlier in the year, Germany was carved up into zones of occupation administered by military forces of the wartime Allies. These sectors encompasses areas associated to the current positions of the Allied armies at the time and in a minature reflection of this, Berlin would reflect the division of the nation. Berlin, a once great city  had suffered catastrophic damage. Once boasting a population of 4.6 million people before the Second World War, it was now reduced to nearly 2.8 million people with only the capacity to produce 2% of the food needed to support the population. The forces of the United States, United Kingdom and France were not permitted to enter the war ravaged city until nearly two months after Germany had capitulated, during which time the local populace suffered brutal reprisals at the hands of the conquering Soviet Red Army.

The western portion of the nation would see the British taking responsibility for most of the northern part of the country, the Americans taking responsibility for the southern part of the country and both turning over two small portions of their zones of occupation that barely contacted each other along the French border over to the forces of France. The eastern portion of the nation would go to the Soviets. One area of protest came with the status of Berlin, which put forces of the United States, United Kingdom and France some 100 miles inside the Soviet zone of occupation. The areas under Soviet control, produced much of the food that fed the nation and thus the regions under American and British control largely relied on food imports from the very beginning. With the United States, United Kingdom and France largely instilling the principles of democracy to their post war areas, the Soviet Military Administration forcibly unified the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 'Communist Party of Germany' and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 'Social Democratic Party of Germany' to form the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands 'Socialist Unity Party of Germany' claiming that it would not occupy a Marxist-Leninist or Soviet stance on its body politics. Immediately after its formation, the SED Party called for the establishment of an anti-fascist, democratic regime in the form of a parliamentary democratic republic. Under this ruse, the Soviets suppressed all activities of non SED aligned political parties and expatriated many factories and equipment as well as their technicians, managers and skilled personnel to regions deep in the Soviet Union.

Soviet leader Josef Stalin made his true intentions clear before the smoke of the Battle of Berlin had even fully cleared, telling German communists that he planned to undermine the authority of the British in their zone of occupation and force the United States to withdraw within the span of two years and thus he would unify Germany as a single communist nations under Soviet control.

One of the loopholes in the agreements reached by the western Allies was that there had never been any formal agreements guaranteeing rail or road access to Berlin through Soviet occupied territory. The first signs of ensuing tensions began when the Soviets imposed a limitation on the amount of cargo that could enter its territory. The Soviets set the limitation at only ten trains per day by only one single rail line. Believing the Soviet limitations were temporary at most, the Allies shrugged it off and began proposing addition alternatives to the Soviet Union which were rejected by the Soviets. In a move to further put a squeeze on the Allies in Berlin, the Soviet Union enforced the utilization of only three air corridors into Berlin with access to Berlin being authorized only from Hamburg, Bückeburg and Frankfurt. As the situation between the former allies began to deteriorate, the Soviets halted the delivery of agricultural goods from their zone of occupation into Berlin. This was countered accordingly when the American Commander, General Lucius Clay halted shipments of dismantled industrial goods from western Germany to the Soviet Union.

Angered by the American action, the Soviets began a campaign to undermine the Allies by slandering the American mission in Germany and hinder the administrative work of all four zones of occupation inside Berlin. Having surviving harsh treatment, forced emigrations, severe political repression and a particularly rough winter of the 1945–1946 period, Germans in the Soviet zone of administration were growing extremely hostile to the Soviets and their plans. Local elections in 1946 resulted in a massive anti-communist protest vote across the city, especially in the Soviet sector of Berlin. Berlin's citizens overwhelmingly elected non-Communist members to its city council reflecting an overwhelming 86% majority. The clouds of trouble had begun building on the horizon.

In January 1948, the Soviets began stopping American and British trains bound for Berlin to confirm the identities of passengers onboard the trains, With the Marshall Plan being enforced across, western Europe the Soviets began orchaestrating a plan to force the Allies to align their interests along with the wishes of the Soviet Union through further regulating access to Berlin. To test the waters, on 25 March 1948, the Soviets issued an order that hindered the movement of traffic between the American, French and British zones of occupation and Berlin stating that no cargo could leave Berlin without the expressed approval of the Soviet Commander.Each truck or train would be searched by Soviet authorities before it would be allowed to leave the city. On 2 April 1948, General Clay halted the use of military trains and ordered that all cargo be flown in and out of the city by air. This venture would be known affectionately as the 'Little Air Lift'. On 10 April 1948, the Soviets eased their restrictions but continued to harass Allied traffic in and out of the city. The Soviets then began a campaign of violations of West Berlin's airspace with their own military aircraft which resulted in a deadly incident on 5 April 1948 when a Soviet Yakovlev Yak-3 fighter collided with a British European Airways Vickers VC.1 Viking transport near RAF Gatow resulting in the deaths of all aboard the colliding aircraft.

The final calm before the store occurred when on 9 April, the Soviets first demanded that American communication equipment in Soviet territory be withdrawn thus preventing the use of navigational beacons to designate air routes. This was followed by a Soviet declaration demanding barges from the west to obtain a special clearance before entering Soviet occupied areas. With the introduction of the new Deutsche Mark in the western part of the country, the Soviets stated that the only currency allowed into Berlin would be one that they issued in a move to keep Germany weakened and in a state of recession. By the time the Soviets began to introduce their own currency into Berlin, the western Allies had already transported 250,000,000 Deutsche Marks into the city and it quickly took over as the standard currency of all four sectors of the city. The introduction of the Deutsche Mark and the Marshall Plan which would bring upon an economic miracle to the nation was seen as a move to undermine Soviet intentions and Stalin interpreted this a provocation against him. He now wanted the Allies out of Berlin completely.

On 18 June 1948, the Deutsche Mark was announced as the new currency to be used in the allied zones of occupation. The Soviets responded by halting all passenger trains and traffic on the autobahns of Berlin. On 21 June, the Soviets refused entry to an American military supply train and sent it back to American territory in western Germany. On 22 June, the Soviets introduced their own new currency that it called the 'Ostmark' for use in it's zone of occupation as a method to undermine the integrity of the Deutsche Mark. Also on the 22nd of June a Soviet official sent a memorandum to the Americans, British and French in the city stating that both their forces and the population of Berlin would be subjected to economic and administrative sanctions that would lead to the circulation in Berlin of only the currency of the Soviet occupation zone. This was followed by a propaganda campaign in which the Soviets denounced the United Kingdom, United States and France by radio, newspaper and loudspeaker. With a large Soviet military exercise on the outskirts of the city, rumors began to circulate of an impending Soviet invasion and occupation. German communists added to this state of aggitation when they staged protests, riots and attacks against pro-West German leaders in Berlin.

The Berlin Blockade would begin on 24 June 1948, when the Soviet forces halted all communications on land and water between the western zones and Berlin. This was quickly followed by the halting of all rail and water traffic in and out of Berlin. The next day, the Soviets halted all supplies of food to the civilian population of western Berlin as well as cut the flow of electricity from power plants in eastern Berlin to the West. For the time being, road access to the city was still authorized but only after a fourteen mile detour to a ferry crossing. The official reasoning was that Soviet forces were conducting repairs to critical infrastructure. Traffic from the western zones of occupation bound for Berlin were blockaded and all arguments permitting to the occupation rights in western Berlin fell on deaf ears. Only Soviet good will towards the western Allies made access to Berlin possible, but with no formal agreement in place the Soviets could negotiate the terms of usage of transit routes in and out of its zone of authority any way that it wished.

West Berlin was now in a critical state. It had on hand only enough food for 36 days, and enough coal to last for only 45 days. Military forces in West Berlin numbered only a force of 8,973 Americans, 7,606 British and 6,100 French in contrast to a force of one and a half million Soviet troops in East Berlin and the Soviet zone of occupation which surrounded it. On 13 June 1948, General Clay sent a cable to Washington D.C. reaffirming his stance in West Berlin and declaring that their would be no withdrawal from Berlin. While, the Soviets celebrated their blockade of Berlin and anticipated the withdrawal of western forces from eastern Germany, General Clay called the Soviets bluff, believing that the Soviets would not intentionally initiate World War III, especially not having just barely recovered from World War II. With limited options at his disposal, Clay heard numerous proposals from Allied leaders including an aggressive response to the blocakde proposed by General Curtis LeMay, the Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe in which waves of Boeing B-29 Stratofortress strategic bombers and fighter escorts would engage Soviet airbases while ground troops in western Germany would attempt a breakthrough to reach encircled Berlin. This plan was ultimately rejected by Clay.

With time running, out Clay authorized the use of Berlin's airways to undermine the Soviet blockade. This was a move that the Soviets had not counted on. On 30 November 1945, the Allies had recieved in writing the approval for free access to Berlin via three twenty three mile wide air corridors. Further undermining the Soviet blockade, the usage of cargo aircraft could not justify the Soviets identifying them as posing a military threat to its forces in eastern Germany and thus put them in a very delicate position when the aircraft refused to turn back of either engaging and shooting them down or backing down. Shooting down unarmed humanitarian aircraft would put the Soviets in violation of their own agreements and cause a political uproar and backlash against the Soviet Union that it would not want. Clay initially approached LeMay with an inquiry regarding whether or not his aircraft could move amounts of coal to support the operations of the city. LeMay promptly responded that his planes could carry anything required. When they approached the British forces, it was confirmed that the British had already been conducting their own airlift in support of British forces in Berlin.

During the 'Little Air Lift' British military planner Air Commodore Reginald Waite made calculations towards the resources required for supporting the entire populace of the city. His calculations equated to a requirement of seventeen hundred calories per person per day, in the form of 646 tons of flour and wheat, 125 tons of cereal, 64 tons of fat, 109 tons of meat and fish, 180 tons of dehydrated potatoes, 180 tons of sugar, 11 tons of coffee, 19 tons of powdered milk, 5 tons of whole milk for children, 3 tons of fresh yeast for baking, 144 tons of dehydrated vegetables, 38 tons of salt and 10 tons of cheese to support the population of Berlin. In conclusion nearly 1,534 tons were needed daily to keep the over two million inhabitants of the encircled city alive. Additionally beyond the food needs, West Berlin needed to be kept heated and powered, which would require another 3,475 tons of coal and gasoline to be flown in.

Initially ill prepared in comparison to the British, the Americans began organizing the positioning of planes to support the operation. The entire thing would get the final green light when General Albert Wedemeyer, US Army Chief of Plans and Operations visited Europe and endorsed the operation. Wedemeyer had overseen the largest airlift of the Second World War when American aircraft flew from bases in India, over the Hump in the Himalayas to China in the war against Japan. The ensuing operation would be dubbed 'Operation Vittles' by the Americans, 'Operation Plainfare' by the British and 'Operation Pelican' by the Australians when they committed additional airlift capailities in September 1948. On 24 June 1948 General LeMay appointed Brigadier General Joseph Smith, then the headquarters commandant for USAFE at Camp Lindsey, to serve as the Provisional Task Force Commander of the airlift operation.  On 25 June 1948 Clay gave the order to launch Operation Vittles. The next day a force of 32 Douglas C-47 Skytrains lifted off for Berlin hauling 80 tons of cargo, including milk, flour, and medicine. The first British Royal Air Force aircraft lifted off headed for Berlin on 28 June. At that time, the airlift was expected to last for only a duration of three weeks.

By 1 July, the system was set into motion with C-47s and Douglas C-54 Skymasters arriving in mass at Rhein Main Air Base. Rhein Main would serve as a solely C-54 base with Wiesbaden operating a mixture of C-47s and C-54s. The aircraft would fly northeast and enter West Berlin through southern air corridor designated the American corridor and land at Tempelhof Airport, offload their supplies then exit through the central air corridor designated the British corridor. Upon reaching the British zone of occupation, the aircraft would then turn south and return to their respective bases. The British Royal Air Force operated a similar resupply system, flying southeast from several airports in the Hamburg area through their assigned corridor into RAF Gatow in the British Sector, and then also returning out on the central corridor. They would then turn for home or land at Hanover depending on the circumstance. Unlike the Americans, the British also ran several round trip operations using their southeastern corridor. On 6 July, RAF Avro York and Douglas Dakotas (the Dakota was the British designation for the C-47 Skytrain) were joined by Short Sunderland flying boats of the Royal Navy. Flying boats operated from Finkenwerder on the Elbe River near Hamburg, flying to the Havel River adjacent to RAF Gatow. The corrosion resistant hull of the Sunderlands better suited them to the particular task of delivering baking powder and other salt products to the city.

A maintenance system was soon coordinated to accommodate the large number of flights. Crews would work three eight hour shifts rotating between C-54s and C-47s. Aircraft were scheduled to take off at an interval of every four minutes, staggered at an altitude of 1,000 feet higher than the preceding aircraft. The initial aircraft would operate at a height of 5,000 feet and each aircraft adding an additional 1,000 feet for each of five aircraft before the sixth aircraft would return to a 5,000 foot operational profile. The first week of the airlift saw an average of only 90 tons of supplies per day reaching West Berlin, this number would increase to nearly 1,000 tons per day by the end of the second week. Soviet authorities in the East ridiculed the operation declaring it a futile attempt to save face against the superior Soviet authority.

On 28 July 1948, Major General William H, Tunner arrived at Wiesbaden Airbase to take command of the airlift operation. Having also had experience with the airlift operation in the China-Burma-India campaign, he set about to reorganize the entire operation. On 13 August 1948 a C-54 crashed at Tempelhof and burst into flames at the end of the runway and a second C-54 landing behind it burst the tires of its landing gear trying to avoid the wreckage. A third Skymaster made a ground loop maneuver on an auxiliary runway and Tempelhof was closed when the control tower lost control of the situation, a move that greatly embarrassed Tunner. Although no one was killed in the crashes, the incident became known as 'Black Friday'. As a result of the Black Friday crash, Tunner ordered that Instrumental Flight Rules be in effect at all times regardless of visibility. In addition to this he instituted a policy that each aircraft would only have one chance to land at the airport, any aborted landing would result in the aircraft returning to its base in western Germany. Sighting easier convenience for loading and unloading of aircraft, Tunner soon made the decision to replace all C-47s with C-54s or larger aircraft.

Pilots were forbidden to leave their aircraft for any reason while on the ground in Berlin and military jeeps were converted into mobile snack bars often staffed with German women to distribute refreshments to the crews while they remained at their aircraft. Clearance documents and flight information were given to the pilots while they snacked. As a result of this method, the time on ground from the shutdown of engines on the ramp, unloading and turn around before heading back to Wiesbaden or Rhein Main was set at only thirty minutes. Operating profiles were later also adjusted with flights launching every three minutes instead of four with 500 foot separation rather than 1000, stacked in altitude from 4,000 to 6,000 feet operating altitude. Maintenance was strictly emphasized and given the highest priority to maximize turn around time to implement a goal of 1440 landings in West Berlin each day. This figure would mean, an aircraft would be landing in West Berlin for every minute there was in a day. The Germans countered the problem of manpower, with Berliners serving as unloaders and airfield repair crews, a task which was rewarded with additional rations. As the crews began to improve their execution of duty, unload times dropped dramatically and a record was set first when an entire 10 ton shipment of coal was offloaded from a C-54 in a span of ten minutes and then later a twelve man crew unloaded another 10 ton shipment from a C-54 in five minutes and forty five seconds.

After only a month of operations, daily flight operations flew more than 1,500 flights each day and delivered more than 4,500 tons of cargo, enough to keep West Berlin sufficiently supplied. Supply shipments improved to a rate of 5,000 tons a day.

One of the most memorable moments of the Berlin Airlift was known as 'Operation Little Vittles' this occurred when Colonel Gail Halvorsen used his off time to fly into Berlin and shot a series of home movies with a handheld camera. One day upon encountering a group of German children he introduced himself and he handed out two sticks of Wrigley's Doublemint gum and promised that if the children did not fight over the gum, he would bring more when he returned to Berlin. As he left, the German children divided up the gum as best they could and inquired as to how they would know that it was him when he returned. His reply was that he would wiggle his wings. The following day on his approach to Berlin, he put inputs into the controls which rocked the aircraft and he dropped chocolate bars attached to hankerchief parachutes to the children below. Everyday the number of children would increase and so to did his airdrops. Soon Base Ops at Tempelhof began receiving stacks of mail addressed to 'Uncle Wiggly Wings', 'The Chocolate Uncle' and the 'Chocolate Flier'. Initially Halvorsen's exploits were met with dissatisfaction from his commanding officer but ultimately the gesture was approved of by General Tunner who designated the mission as 'Operation Little Vittles' adding additional airplanes and pilots to Halvorsen's venture. When news of Operation Little Vittles reached the United States, children across th country enthusiastically donated candy of their own to be dropped to the German children. Some children even participated by attaching parachutes to the candies that would be dropped over Berlin. Soon, major manufacturers nationwide became involved. In the end, over three tons of candy were dropped on West Berlin, and the "operation" was designated as a success. The candy dropping aircraft were christened 'Raisin Bombers" or "Candy Bombers" by the German children.

In response to the mounting airlift operation, the Soviets first countered by offering free food to anyone who crossed into East Berlin and registered their ration cards with the Soviet authorities. The Soviet move was ultimately rejected by West Berliners. The Soviets then ramped up their propaganda campaign against the people of West Berlin utilizing psychological warfare and declaring that all of Berlin fell under Soviet authority. They further declared that it was only a matter of time before the Western allies abandoned the city and the populous of West Berlin. As further measures, Soviet and German communist harassed democratically elected officials from West Berlin that had to conduct its business in the city hall which was located in the Soviet sector of the city. In an effort to harass the airlift itself, the Soviets often attempted to impede on the arrival of inbound aircraft by varying means including buzzing transports with Soviet fighters, scheduling parachute jumps in the paths of the air corridors and using searchlights to disorient pilots flying at night. Try as they may, none of the Soviet measures were effective in hampering the operation.

By the onset of winter, estimates for amounts needed to sustain the population in winter were adjusted and the transportation force was enhanced when the Royal Air Force added larger Handley Page Hasting transports to their available fleet. To accommodate for winter operations, Tunner hired a force of majorily former Luftwaffe ground crews to maintain the airfields. Due to weight restrictions imposed on the airfields at RAF Gatow and Tempelhof Airport, and the stresses put upon them by the rotations of C-54s, a 6,000 foot asphalt runway was constructed at Tempelhof to better accommodate the air fleet. The French although entangled in the Indochina War supplied several aging Junkers Ju-52 transports to supply its personnel in Berlin. French aircraft flew into Tegel on the shores of Lake Tegel. There was one problem with this, the approach to Tegel Airfield was hampered by the placement of a Soviet radio tower in proximity to the airfield. After the Soviets refused to remove the tower, French General Jean Ganeval ordered that the tower be demolished and on 16 December 1948, the tower was blown up much to the delight of the Berliners. The destruction of the radio tower would spark widespread protest from the Soviets. When General Ganeval's Soviet counterpart General Alexej Kotikow, asked him angrily by phone how he could have committed such an act, Ganeval is said to have replied laconically, "With dynamite, my dear colleague."

To improve control over the air traffic entering and exiting Berlin, the newly developed Ground Controlled Approach radar system was sent to Europe and installed at both Tempelhof and  Fassberg in the British Zone in West Germany, a measure which guaranteed operations in all weather conditions. Soon the only hinderance on flight operations would prove to be the weather itself. The months of November and December 1948 were the worst of the entire operation. On many occasions aircraft would fly to Berlin only to be met with a thick layer of fog which prevented landing and they were forced to return to West Germany. On one occasion on 20 November 1948, forty two aircraft departed for West Berlin, but only one managed to there. At one point, West Berlin only had enough coal for one week of operation. The shortage was made up for ultimately when weather conditions improved and more than 171,000 tons of supplies were delivered in January 1949, followed by 152,000 tons in February, and 196,223 tons in March.

By April 1949, General Tunner declared that he wanted to do something big to boost the morale of everyone involved in the operation. On Easter Sunday, he set to break all records and he would do so by only hauling coal thus in preparation for this coal was stockpiled for the effort. By the time it was completed, 12,941 tons of coal had been delivered in 1,383 flights to West Berlin, without a single accident. A welcome side effect of the effort was that operations in general were boosted, and tonnage increased from 6,729 tons to 8,893 tons per day in the days following the Easter operation. In total, the airlift delivered 234,476 tons in April of 1949. On 21 April, it was recorded that the tonnage of supplies flown into the city exceeded amounts that were previously brought into the city by rail.

The Airlift operation proved an embarrassment to the Soviets and the Easter operation was the nail in the coffin. On 15 April 1949, the Soviets announced that they were willing to lift the blockade of Berlin. After a series of negotiations on 4 May 1949, the Allies reached an agreement which would end the Blockade in an eight day period. The Soviets relented and removed their blockade of Berlin at 12:01 on the morning of 12 May 1949. The British drove a convoy through Berlin as a symbol of the victory of the airlift and the first train from West Germany arrived in West Berlin at 5:32am. Celebrations erupted across West Berlin to commemorate the lifting of the Blockade. Flights however would continue into Berlin to build up a surplus of supplies in case the Soviets tried to blockade the city again in the future. By 24 July 1949, three months worth of supplies had been stockpiled at facilities in West Berlin, ensuring that there was ample time to restart the Airlift if it were required. The Berlin Airlift officially came to an end on 30 September 1949, after fifteen months of continued air operation. In total the United States delivered 1,783,573 tons and the United Kingdom 541,937 tons, totaling 2,326,406 tons, nearly two-thirds of which was coal, on some 278,228 flights to airfields in West Berlin.

The Royal Australian Air Force bolsted this number further with the  delivery of 7,968 tonnes of freight and 6,964 passengers while flying 2,062 sorties. The force of C-47s and C-54s together flew over 92 million miles during the operation, almost the distance from Earth to the Sun. At the height of the Berlin Airlift, one plane was landing at an airfield in West Berlin every thirty seconds. The cost of the Airlift was 101 fatalities including 40 Britons and 31 Americans, mostly due to crashes. Seventeen American and eight British aircraft crashed during the duration of the operation. Financial responsibility of the Airlift was shared between the United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany. Some 692 transport aircraft were engaged in the Berlin Airlift, of which more than 100 were operated by civilian aviation entities.

In 1974 Colonel Gail Halvorsen, the original 'Candy Bomber' was decorated with the Großes Bundesverdienstkreuz 'Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany', one of Germany's highest medals for his actions during the Berlin Airlift.

Shturmovik Reborn: The Soviet Air Force and the Sukhoi Su-25

With the success of the Ilyushin design Il-2 Bark and Il-10 Beast ground attack platforms employed against Nazi forces during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet commanders realized the need for capable close air support aviation to assist ground forces early on. As technological advancements progressed and jet technology began to overtake the development of propellor driven designs, the problem soon began to arise in the form of replacement of these earlier designs in the ground attack capacity. By the 1960's Soviet fighter bombers in active service were unsuitable for ground attack roles. Their high operational speeds made them unsuited for delivering precision strikes and their loiter and time on target were minimal. Another drawback to existing Soviet fighter bombers such as the Sukhoi Su-7/ Su-17 Fitter, Mikoyan Gurevich MiG-21 Fishbed and Mikoyan Gurevich MiG-23 Flanker was their lack of suitable armored plating to protect the pilot and vital systems from ground fire. Having researched the influences that made the Ilyushin designs so successful during the Great Patriotic War and taking into consideration the drawbacks of existing fighter bomber designs, Pavel Sukhoi founder of the Sukhoi Design Bureau along with a team of aerospace engineers began preliminary design work for a new design that would meet the requirements of both the of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry and the Ministry of Defense.

The official request for a new battlefield close air support aircraft was issued by the Soviet Air Force in March of 1969. Four Soviet design bureaus responded to the announcement of the competition: Sukhoi, Yakovlev, Ilyushin and Mikoyan-Gurevich. Sukhoi's design officially designated as the T8 had been finalized in 1968 with the first two prototypes being built in 1972. The first of the prototypes was unveiled during the Soviet May Day holiday of 9 May 1974, however it would not take to the air until 22 February 1975. The competition was soon narrowed down between the Sukhoi T8 design and the Ilyushin designed Il-42. However following a series of fly offs and trials before the Soviet Defense Ministry, the Sukhoi design was chosen over the Ilyushin type and awarded a production contract.

Production of the Sukhoi design now designated as Su-25 would begin at Factory No.31 located in Tbilisi in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. With the first production models being delivered to the Soviet Air Force in 1978. It would be given the NATO reporting code of 'Frogfoot'.

The Su-25 has an all metal trapezoidal wing mounted at the shoulder of the fuselage, and a conventional tailplane and rudder system. The overall construction of the aircraft utilizes different metals and materials with nearly 60% of the airframe being made of aluminum, 19% steel, 13.5% titanium alloy, 2% magnesium alloy and 5.5% other materials. Initial versions of the Su-25 were equipped with twin R95Sh non-afterburning turbojets. The aircraft was designed as a single seat airframe with a single GSh-30-2 30mm cannon mounted in a compartment beneath the cockpit. The pilot sits in a titanium bathtub similar to that of the American Fairchild-Republic A-10 Thunderbolt and entry into the cockpit is by a hinged canopy. The cockpit is relatively cramped and the pilot sits rather low in the enclosure a trade off in visibility for protection to the pilot at the controls. A periscope assembly is attached to the top of the canopy in an attempt to improve rearward visibility for the attack pilot.

The Su-25 does not have a television guidance system but does have a nose mounted laser rangefinder for target designation capabilities an a DISS-7 doppler radar for navigation. It could operate in both day and night environments and is equipped with the SO-69 identification system, which serves as a friend or foe designation transponder. For defensive measures, the Su-25 has several countermeasures installed on the airframe, the first is the SPO-15 radar warning receiver and the second is a system of chaff and flare dispensers capable of punching off 250 flares and chaff to confuse enemy guidance systems.

In its role of close air support, the Su-25 would mount weaponry on eleven hardpoints with the capability of carrying 8,818lbs of ordnance. Weaponry included an assortment of UV-32-57 57mm, B8M1 80mm rocket pods, S-24 240mm or S-25 330mm rockets, Kh-23, AS-9, Kh-25L, Kh-29 air to surface missiles or an assortment of 1,000lb bombs with 250 rounds of 30mm ammunition for the GSh-30-2 30mm cannon.

The first Soviet Air Force unit to receive the new type was the 200th Independent Attack Squadron, based at Sitalcay air base in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The first eleven aircraft arrived at Sitalchay in May 1981. Soon afterwards this unit would be deployed to Afghanistan in support of Soviet military operations in the embattled nation. Throughout the duration of the Soviet counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamic Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, Soviet Air Force Su-25s launched nearly 139 guided missiles of varying types against Mujahideen positions in the wartorn nation. On average, each Su-25 flew 360 combat sorties per year, a total considerably higher than that of any other combat aircraft type in Afghanistan. By the end of the war, nearly 50 Su-25s had been deployed to airbases in Afghanistan and carried out a total of 60,000 combat sorties. Between the first deployment in 1981 and the end of the war in 1989, 21 aircraft would be lost in combat operations.

Su-25s were also deployed to airfields in the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to support Soviet interests in the region and to counter NATO forces in the region. In the event of war with NATO, Su-25s would serve in similar roles to that of the American A-10 and British Harrier attack platforms flying close support missions against NATO positions utilizing their slow speed and design characteristics to get down in the folds of the terrain of the low altitude structure and provide accurate support for advancing Warsaw Pact forces. For self defense against intercepting NATO fighters, the Su-25 could carry the AA-2 or AA-8 air to air missile. The 30mm cannon would be employed against armored targets although, the Su-25s 30mm cannon did not match the rate of fire of the American GAU-8 Avenger 30mm cannon mounted on the A-10.

Like all Soviet designs, the Su-25 was a rugged machine designed with simplicity in mind and with the capability to operate in the harshest of conditions from roughly prepared airfields. It would go on to serve in successor nations after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and continues as a potent battlefield platform in the modern age.

Violence in the East: Crushing the Workers Uprising of 1953

Since its inception as an 'ideology of the people' communism stood as a deception of human rights. Communist party leaders widely used the propaganda highlights of the advancement of communism often substituting the Marxist-Leninist ideology's terminology with the word 'socialism'. Officially everything was done with the interests of the people of the nation in mind. Everything was to be divided and shared equally upon the people, more specifically the working class. The 'nations of the people' often were referred to by the inclusion of the terms 'People' or 'Socialist' into the official names of the respective nation such as the People's Republic of Poland, Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic or the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Outwardly, the republics under the influence of the greater Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are model entities of freedom for the people to choose their own destinies for the greater good of humanity. In reality, they are most often corrupt totalitarian regimes with a near perverse domination over every aspect of life in the nations they govern. The governments of these regimes most often persecuted the very people they claimed to represent. The true face of Soviet style communism would flare up numerous times during the post war period in Europe with one particular event taking place in East Germany that would foreshadow events to come in the self proclaimed 'Worker's Paradise'.

The event that would show just how repressive the communist regime in the German Democratic Republic could actually be began in June of 1953, when a work party of some 300 construction workers tasked with the constructing the Stalinallee in East Berlin staged a strike against the ruling Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED communist party. The workers strike could not have come at a more worst time for the government in East Germany. The year before reforms were enforced under the demands of Soviet premier Joseph Stalin for greater Sovietization of East Germany which forced farmers, tradesman and business owners to surrender to communism through raised fees. The economic crisis was worsening as military expenditures rose, along with reparations payments to the Soviet Union and with focus placed more on developing industrial capabilities rather than producing food and goods for the population, East Germany was soon faced with a severe crisis. By the beginning of 1953, the further problem of mass defections from East Germany often referred to as the 'brain drain' constituted a major economic and social problem for the new nation. Amongst these problems were also factors that included a high number of political prisoners in East German custody, as well as intensifying persecution of members of religious groups.

The Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands led by General Secretary Walter Ulbricht decided that in the face of these problems, norms for all workers would have to be raised. Work quotas would be increased by 10% with the workers wages generally remaining the same all while taxes and prices for goods and services would be increased. These measures were approved by the East German Council of Ministers on 28 May 1953 with a goal of them being fully implemented by 30 June 1953, the 60th birthday of East German leader Walter Ulbricht. The punishment for workers not meeting the new quotas would come in the form of  a reduction of salaries.

In response to the new directives, 300 construction workers in East Berlin went on strike protesting the new order and the directive that failure to meet increased quotas would lead to a reduction in pay. They marched down the Stalinallee voicing their displeasure with the government soon joined by more and more dissatisfied citizens. The spark of political dissidence soon spread across East Germany in the following days thanks partially by western radio broadcasts and word of mouth in the small communist nation. By 17 June 1953, Soviet troops assigned to the Group of Soviet Forces Germany began entering East Berlin and taking up positions to counter the increasing formations of striking workers assembled in public places heading towards the center of the city. At the sight of the mass strikers, the Volkspolizei as well as elements of the Kasernierte Volkspolizei were deployed however lacking instructions on how to deal with the situation they did not initially intervene.

Soon Volkspolizei and elements of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, the East German youth organization along with representatives of the SED communist party began making attempts to return the workers to their places of employment or to their homes. Most often these attempts proved futile and when these elements tried to restrain the growing numbers of protests they found themselves on the defensive as the groups often assaulted or chanted against them. Signs and banners were soon hoisted as more and more disgruntled workers and farmers arrived into East Berlin joining the movement towards the city center.  The angry demonstrators demanded a return to the previously established work norms, as well as labor reform, decreases in the price of goods and services, the release of fellow protestors who had been arrested by the Volkspolizei the previous day, and free elections for the people of East Germany without the influence of the Soviet Union. As the movement grew in East Berlin, protestors began shouting various slogans voicing displeasure in the SED such as "Death to Communism!", or "Down with the Government!", and even slogans voicing approval for the American that had commanded allied forces in the liberation of Germany from the Nazis during the Second World War such as "Long live Eisenhower!"

By 9:00a.m. some 25,000 people assembled at the House of Ministries followed by tens of thousands of additional protestors. By 11:00a.m. a large number of protestors stormed the government building celebrating and boasting that they had overpowered that they had defeated the force of 500 members of the Volkspolizei and members of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit or Stasi.

Soon the protests would turn violent as Soviet armored vehicles of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany pushed towards the government areas to curb a coup detat. By 12:00 the Soviet forces had cleared the area around the SED headquarters and soon fighting would erupt between disgruntled citizens and the combined force of Soviet military and East German Volkspolizei. Initially these were only small skirmishes but when the demands of the protestors turned to political demands, and the demonstrators began calling for the overthrow of the East German government, Ulbricht ordered that the uprising be quelled through the use of force. A force consisting of 16 Soviet divisions with 20,000 troops alongside 8,000 members of the Kasernierte Volkspolizei were ordered to quell the uprising.

One of the most significant clashes in East Berlin occurred along the Unter den Linden, a street between the Brandenburg Gate and Marx-Engels Platz which housed many government offices. Here a combined force of Soviet troops and Kasernierte Volkspolizei opened fire on the advancing protestors. Gunfire would erupt across East Berlin including along the Potsdamer Platz.

As the dawn of 18 June 1953 rose over East Berlin, a large number of East German citizens lay dead including not only protestors but also members of the SED communist party. Several thousand lay wounded with several thousand more in custody having been arrested by the Volkspolizei. Of these incarcerated a large number were tried and sentenced to death along with those executed when martial law was declared and it was even declared that several Soviet soldiers were executed for dereliction of duty when they refused to open fire on the East German protestors. No official figures of the number of people killed, wounded or imprisoned have ever surfaced regarding the 1953 uprising in East Germany however figures varied depending on who researched the incident. The West German Ministry of Inter-German Affairs released estimates reflecting a rather high casualty toll while the East German government remained mute about the incident. 

The East German Politburo would meet in the aftermath of the uprisings on 20 June 1953, with members of the SED expressing first hand encounters of the uprisings thus justifying the intervention of Soviet forces in East German affairs. The meeting also reaffirmed East Germany's request for Soviet forces to remain in position following the lift of martial law in East Berlin. Measures were also taken to increase the production of goods for the East German people as well as importing foods and raw materials into the German Democratic Republic to try and stabilize the economic situation of the nation.

As a response to the uprisings in the East, West Germany would commemorate the rebellion by declaring 17 June a national holiday, declaring it German Unity Day as a day to celebrate when the German people rose up and took a stance against communism. 

Red Berlin? The Plan to Surrender West Berlin to the Soviet Union

From the onset of the Cold War, Berlin would become a major focal point for any potential conflict in Germany. With allied troops from the United States, United Kingdom and France maintaining strategically significant positions deep inside the borders of the communist East Germany this would serve as a constant thorn in the side of the Soviet Union. Tensions in Europe would reach a fever pitch when on 13 August 1961, military and paramilitary forces of East Germany following years of dealing with unrestricted defections to the West via West Berlin walled in the city with a barrier consisting of miles of concrete, watch towers, and anti vehicle ditches amongst other defensive installations. There were also forces at work at the time which could have completely rewritten the story of the Cold War in one of the most underhanded and deceptive events in the volatile history of the Cold War. West Berlin, a bastion of hope for millions desperate to escape the authoritarian pressure of the East German communist system could have potentially been handed over to the Soviet Union in exchange for more land in what was East German territory.

The potential transfer of West Berlin to the Soviets was discussed secretly between government representatives of West Germany and the United States, a move that completely deceived the other members of the western Allies the United Kingdom and France. The prize for the surrender of West Berlin to the Soviet Union? The Federal Republic of Germany would expand its borders eastwards into parts of the East German states of Thuringia as well as parts of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The cities of Schwerin and Leipzig would become incorporated into West Germany as well as West Germany receiving territories rich in natural resources such as brown coal and industrially significant centers of manufacture and production.

The plan for the relinquishing of West Berlin was initially devised in the hours of the construction of the Berlin Wall by the Chancellor of West Germany Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer a strong statesman deeply opposed to the idea of East Germany, was responsible for the resurgence of West Germany's economy in the aftermath of the Second World War and was a guiding force to West Germany's entry into NATO in 1955. After the establishment of the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and in the aftermath of a failed attempt to strangle West Germany into submission, leaders of the Soviet Union began to repeatedly call for the surrender of West Berlin to East Germany and the removal of western military forces from the city. One of the primary proponents for the withdrawal of western military forces was Nikita Khrushchev, whom over the course of his tenure as premier of the Soviet Union demanded the withdrawal in the form of ultimatums on numerous occasions. He was also a guiding factor in the decision to erect the Berlin Wall to seal West Berlin in away from the outside world.

With Soviet armored columns set up at various checkpoints facing west while construction forces hastily erected the fortifications, Adenauer approached the United States with the proposed betrayal. Bypassing both the United Kingdom and France, he proposed the idea to both American Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President John F. Kennedy suggesting that the United States would be able to negotiate a deal with the Soviet Union, thus gaining West Germany more territory and allowing the Soviets to achieve a major goal in its policies towards Germany.

As far fetched as the idea was, Adenauer viewed West Berlin as a pawn in a larger chess game which could be traded at any moment just so long as the United States agreed to the move. It was however, highly unlikely that the proposal would be accepted by the Kremlin in Moscow. As tempting a prize as West Berlin would be for the Soviets in forcing the West beyond East Germany's borders it would require East Germany to relinquish part of its industrial base over to West Germany. The move was viewed by Adenauer to be a political gamble that he could profit from as well as causing some tribulation between East Germany and their Soviet overlords in the event that the Soviets showed signs of being interested in the proposal. The benefit that the West would get from the transfer of West Berlin, would come in the form of extinguishing long standing tensions with the Soviet Union over control of Berlin.

The plan however tempting to Adenauer, was ultimately shot down by President Kennedy who declared West Berlin as a fist made of brick and mortar  that the United States would defend from the Soviet Union at all costs. It would be his decision that defined the Berlin commitment as well as the commitment to West Germany as territories that would be protected from communism to any extent.

Kennedy refused to bow to the Soviets and deliver the city of millions to communist control at a time of extreme tension with the Soviets. in 1960, American pilot Francis Gary Powers and his Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady reconnnaissance aircraft were shot down over Sverdlovsk deep in the heart of the Soviet Union and on October 1962, the Soviets began positioning nuclear missiles on the Caribbean island nation of Cuba which would result in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Having trumped the Americans twice so far the next move would be Kennedy's and on 26 June 1963, during a visit to West Berlin, Kennedy reaffirmed that stance of the United States to defend West Germany and West Berlin when he made famous speech ending it with the phrase "Ich bin ein Berliner".

Adenauer would remain the Chancellor of West Germany until October 1963, when he was austed from the position turning it over to Ludwig Erhard following a political scandal regarding inept findings about the Bundeswehr. President Kennedy would be assassinated a month later in Dallas in November of 1963.

Adenauer would remain chairman of the West German Christian Democratic Union or CDU political party until his resignation in December of 1966 before passing away himself on 19 April 1967. With his death, went the secret plan for the betrayal of West Berlin to the Soviets and East Germans. The United Kingdom and France would remain oblivious to the secret proposal and the Cold War would continue on for another twenty years with many citizens of West Berlin also oblivious to just how close they may have came to being betrayed by the very man who had promised to support them.

Conflict between Comrades: Tension along the Oder-Neisse Line

Although the military forces of the German Democratic Republic were never deployed outside of East Germany's borders, they maintained a high state of readiness prepared to engage in acts of warfare against the western aggressors at a moments notice. In the event of an attack from NATO or on the orders of Moscow, the Nationale Volksarmee would be the tip of the spear being the vanguard force to engage the enemy. In the event of war, the NVA would essentially be absorbed into Soviet command structures operating in support of friendly Warsaw Pact military units. The Soviets under the banner of promoting socialism and unity amongst the allied nations of the Warsaw Pact held vast military exercises influencing what was known amongst the East Germans as 'waffenbruderschaft' or armed brotherhood. After the signing of the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance by eight communist nations in eastern Europe on 14 May 1955 as a direct response to the formation of NATO , the Warsaw Pact went into effect promising mutual defensive assistance among the signing nations. The only problem was that not everything was as it seemed amongst two 'allies' the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Poland.

The cause for the friction between the two nations was a disputed border line between East Germany and Poland drawn in the aftermath of the Second World War known as the Oder-Neisse line. The line was comprised primarily of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse Rivers which flow into the Baltic Sea to the north of both nations. The Oder-Neisse line was determined during the final months of the Second World War and it was designated that all territory east of the line which Germany has historically held would be turned over to Poland. Under this plan, much of the territory that had comprised the former Weimar Republic and traditionally East Prussia were to be divided up with the majority going to Poland and northern East Prussia was to be turned over to the Soviet Union. Before the Second World War, the border was recognized partially along the historical borders of the Holy Roman Empire and Greater Poland with appropriate adjustments made to accommodate ethnic compositions beyond the traditional provincial borders.

By the latter months of the Second World War, thought had already been taken into how not only post-war Germany would be divided up, but also how it's borders were to be drawn as well as those for the rest of eastern Europe. Originally Germany was to retain the town of Stettin on the Baltic Sea, while Poland was to annex the territories of East Prussia and Königsberg. The idea behind the East Prussia absorbing was that East Prussia's positioning effectively undermined the territorial and defensive integrity of Poland. The Polish government also wanted the transfer of the Silesian region of Oppeln, along with the Pomeranian regions which included Danzig, Bütow and Lauenburg. Finally to complete their claims, Poland demanded a straightening of the border in the territory of Western Pomerania. As Soviet armies swarmed across eastern Europe headed west towards Germany, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin decided that the USSR would claim the region of Königsberg which would be used as a warm water port for use by the Soviet Navy. In exchange for Königsberg, the Soviets argued that Poland should receive the town of Stettin. The Poles insisted on retaining the city of Lwów but Stalin rejected this idea, offering that all of Lower Silesia along with the city of Breslau be given to Poland.

With an undetermined border being disputed amongst differing parties, the Western Allies generally accepted that the Oder River would be Poland's western border, but it remained undetermined if the border should be based upon the eastern or western Neisse River and whether or not Stettin which traditionally served as a port to Berlin would remain German or Polish. The Western Allies pushed for the border line to be along the eastern Neisse River at Breslau however, Stalin rejected this proposal. The final decision on the border line came at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 when it was decided that Stettin would be renamed Szczecin and turned over to the Poles and the boundary would be drawn between the western Neisse River and the Kwisa River. With the finalized Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, it was decided that all German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line would be turned over to Poland and that all Germans inhabiting land in the new and old Polish territories would be expelled from the region. The new acquisitions to Poland's territory was known as the 'recovered territories' and the border concession was agreed to primarily because it was the shortest border between Germany and Poland at only 293 miles in length stretching from the estuaries of the Baltic Sea to the northernmost point of Czechoslovakia.

When the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands 'Socialist Unity Party of Germany' was founded on 21 April 1946 by the merger of two former communist parties in the section of eastern Germany under Soviet administration, the SED initially refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as the border area. With Soviet troops occupying its territory and with heavy pressure coming from Moscow, the SED relented and the term Friedensgrenze or 'Border of Peace' was developed to reference the area. On 6 July 1950, the German Democratic Republic now its own state, had signed an agreement known as the Treaty of Zgorzelec with the People's Republic of Poland which recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the official boundary. With preliminary offers of German reunification eing formulated, Josef Stalin propsed that the recognition of the Oder Neisse line be but one of many conditions which would be grounds for reunifying the divided nations. West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer rejected the offer under West Germany's policy of not recognizing the sovereignity of the German Democratic Republic or the communist government of the People's Republic of Poland. The border line was seen by many in West Germany as unacceptable as West Germany had received some 12 million displaced refugees from their expulsions from Poland's annexation of former German territories.

With the land border between Poland and East Germany effectively settled by the Treaty of Zgorzelec, the maritime borders remained disputed. The port city of Szczecin became highly contested with the SED in East Berlin declaring East Germany's territorial waters extended twelve miles out into the Baltic Sea rather than only three miles into the Baltic Sea. By 1985, it was rumored that naval forces of East Germany's navy, the Volksmarine and Poland's navy, the Marynarka Wojenna clashed several times over the rights of their respective nation's fishing boats, yachts and freighters crossing the Pomeranian Bay to reach Szczecin's ports. It was said that on several occasions gunfire was even exchanged between forces of the two navies. Leaders of the People's Republic of Poland claimed the Szczecin issue was an economic matter involving rights to use the Bay of Pomerania which the East German's were undermining at a time when the Poles were reinventing the harbors of Szczecin into a free trade zone. East Germany's claims to the Bay of Pomerania and access to Szczecin's ports were largely seen as an extension of the rift between East and West Germany.

East Berlin asserted that the presence of the Volksmarine was to soley protect its territorial integrity. Naval forces of the Volksmarine frequently detained fishing boats that it felt had violated East Germany's waters and impounded them. On many occasions the Marynarka Wojenna would hasten to the scene in an attempt to deter the incident at hand. Official recognition of the naval clashes was never publicly announced however on one occasion it was documented that in February of 1984 a freighter from Turkey had been stopped by East German warships. The ship had mistakenly strayed from its designated sea lanes and in response to the East German seizure of the vessel, the People's Republic of Poland deployed its own warships confirmed to be armed with live ammunition and rockets to retrieve the freighter from East German custody. It would not be until 1988, that the maritime border issue would be resolved when it was determined that two thirds of the disputed maritime border area where to go to the German Democratic Republic.

It would not be until shortly before reunification in 1989 that a treaty would be formally implemented to acknowledge the new maritime border between the two nations. It would be but one of several fractures in the facade of socialist unity during the latter years of the Cold War as reformist governments set to implement new policies and work in their own best interests.