The western portion
of the nation would see the British taking responsibility for most of the
northern part of the country, the Americans taking responsibility for the
southern part of the country and both turning over two small portions of their
zones of occupation that barely contacted each other along the French border
over to the forces of France. The eastern portion of the nation would go to the
Soviets. One area of protest came with the status of Berlin, which put forces
of the United States, United Kingdom and France some 100 miles inside the
Soviet zone of occupation. The areas under Soviet control, produced much of the
food that fed the nation and thus the regions under American and British
control largely relied on food imports from the very beginning. With the United
States, United Kingdom and France largely instilling the principles of
democracy to their post war areas, the Soviet Military Administration forcibly
unified the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 'Communist Party of Germany' and
the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 'Social Democratic Party of
Germany' to form the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands 'Socialist
Unity Party of Germany' claiming that it would not occupy a Marxist-Leninist or
Soviet stance on its body politics. Immediately after its formation, the SED
Party called for the establishment of an anti-fascist, democratic regime in the
form of a parliamentary democratic republic. Under this ruse, the Soviets
suppressed all activities of non SED aligned political parties and expatriated
many factories and equipment as well as their technicians, managers and skilled
personnel to regions deep in the Soviet Union.
Soviet leader Josef
Stalin made his true intentions clear before the smoke of the Battle of Berlin
had even fully cleared, telling German communists that he planned to undermine
the authority of the British in their zone of occupation and force the United
States to withdraw within the span of two years and thus he would unify Germany
as a single communist nations under Soviet control.
One of the loopholes
in the agreements reached by the western Allies was that there had never been
any formal agreements guaranteeing rail or road access to Berlin through Soviet
occupied territory. The first signs of ensuing tensions began when the Soviets
imposed a limitation on the amount of cargo that could enter its territory. The
Soviets set the limitation at only ten trains per day by only one single rail
line. Believing the Soviet limitations were temporary at most, the Allies
shrugged it off and began proposing addition alternatives to the Soviet Union
which were rejected by the Soviets. In a move to further put a squeeze on the
Allies in Berlin, the Soviet Union enforced the utilization of only three air
corridors into Berlin with access to Berlin being authorized only from Hamburg,
Bückeburg and Frankfurt. As the situation between the former allies began to
deteriorate, the Soviets halted the delivery of agricultural goods from their
zone of occupation into Berlin. This was countered accordingly when the
American Commander, General Lucius Clay halted shipments of dismantled
industrial goods from western Germany to the Soviet Union.
Angered by the
American action, the Soviets began a campaign to undermine the Allies by
slandering the American mission in Germany and hinder the administrative work
of all four zones of occupation inside Berlin. Having surviving harsh
treatment, forced emigrations, severe political repression and a particularly
rough winter of the 1945–1946 period, Germans in the Soviet zone of
administration were growing extremely hostile to the Soviets and their plans.
Local elections in 1946 resulted in a massive anti-communist protest vote
across the city, especially in the Soviet sector of Berlin. Berlin's citizens
overwhelmingly elected non-Communist members to its city council reflecting an
overwhelming 86% majority. The clouds of trouble had begun building on the
horizon.
In January 1948, the
Soviets began stopping American and British trains bound for Berlin to confirm
the identities of passengers onboard the trains, With the Marshall Plan being
enforced across, western Europe the Soviets began orchaestrating a plan to
force the Allies to align their interests along with the wishes of the Soviet
Union through further regulating access to Berlin. To test the waters, on 25
March 1948, the Soviets issued an order that hindered the movement of traffic
between the American, French and British zones of occupation and Berlin stating
that no cargo could leave Berlin without the expressed approval of the Soviet
Commander.Each truck or train would be searched by Soviet authorities before it
would be allowed to leave the city. On 2 April 1948, General Clay halted the use
of military trains and ordered that all cargo be flown in and out of the city
by air. This venture would be known affectionately as the 'Little Air Lift'. On
10 April 1948, the Soviets eased their restrictions but continued to harass
Allied traffic in and out of the city. The Soviets then began a campaign of
violations of West Berlin's airspace with their own military aircraft which
resulted in a deadly incident on 5 April 1948 when a Soviet Yakovlev Yak-3
fighter collided with a British European Airways Vickers VC.1 Viking transport
near RAF Gatow resulting in the deaths of all aboard the colliding aircraft.
The final calm before
the store occurred when on 9 April, the Soviets first demanded that American
communication equipment in Soviet territory be withdrawn thus preventing the
use of navigational beacons to designate air routes. This was followed by a
Soviet declaration demanding barges from the west to obtain a special clearance
before entering Soviet occupied areas. With the introduction of the new Deutsche
Mark in the western part of the country, the Soviets stated that the only
currency allowed into Berlin would be one that they issued in a move to keep
Germany weakened and in a state of recession. By the time the Soviets began to
introduce their own currency into Berlin, the western Allies had already
transported 250,000,000 Deutsche Marks into the city and it quickly took over
as the standard currency of all four sectors of the city. The introduction of
the Deutsche Mark and the Marshall Plan which would bring upon an economic
miracle to the nation was seen as a move to undermine Soviet intentions and
Stalin interpreted this a provocation against him. He now wanted the Allies out
of Berlin completely.
On 18 June 1948, the
Deutsche Mark was announced as the new currency to be used in the allied zones
of occupation. The Soviets responded by halting all passenger trains and
traffic on the autobahns of Berlin. On 21 June, the Soviets refused entry to an
American military supply train and sent it back to American territory in
western Germany. On 22 June, the Soviets introduced their own new currency that
it called the 'Ostmark' for use in it's zone of occupation as a method to
undermine the integrity of the Deutsche Mark. Also on the 22nd of June a Soviet
official sent a memorandum to the Americans, British and French in the city
stating that both their forces and the population of Berlin would be subjected
to economic and administrative sanctions that would lead to the circulation in
Berlin of only the currency of the Soviet occupation zone. This was followed by
a propaganda campaign in which the Soviets denounced the United Kingdom, United
States and France by radio, newspaper and loudspeaker. With a large Soviet
military exercise on the outskirts of the city, rumors began to circulate of an
impending Soviet invasion and occupation. German communists added to this state
of aggitation when they staged protests, riots and attacks against pro-West
German leaders in Berlin.
The Berlin Blockade
would begin on 24 June 1948, when the Soviet forces halted all communications
on land and water between the western zones and Berlin. This was quickly
followed by the halting of all rail and water traffic in and out of Berlin. The
next day, the Soviets halted all supplies of food to the civilian population of
western Berlin as well as cut the flow of electricity from power plants in
eastern Berlin to the West. For the time being, road access to the city was
still authorized but only after a fourteen mile detour to a ferry crossing. The
official reasoning was that Soviet forces were conducting repairs to critical
infrastructure. Traffic from the western zones of occupation bound for Berlin
were blockaded and all arguments permitting to the occupation rights in western
Berlin fell on deaf ears. Only Soviet good will towards the western Allies made
access to Berlin possible, but with no formal agreement in place the Soviets
could negotiate the terms of usage of transit routes in and out of its zone of
authority any way that it wished.
West Berlin was now
in a critical state. It had on hand only enough food for 36 days, and enough
coal to last for only 45 days. Military forces in West Berlin numbered only a
force of 8,973 Americans, 7,606 British and 6,100 French in contrast to a force
of one and a half million Soviet troops in East Berlin and the Soviet zone of
occupation which surrounded it. On 13 June 1948, General Clay sent a cable to
Washington D.C. reaffirming his stance in West Berlin and declaring that their
would be no withdrawal from Berlin. While, the Soviets celebrated their
blockade of Berlin and anticipated the withdrawal of western forces from
eastern Germany, General Clay called the Soviets bluff, believing that the
Soviets would not intentionally initiate World War III, especially not having
just barely recovered from World War II. With limited options at his disposal,
Clay heard numerous proposals from Allied leaders including an aggressive
response to the blocakde proposed by General Curtis LeMay, the Commander of
United States Air Forces in Europe in which waves of Boeing B-29 Stratofortress
strategic bombers and fighter escorts would engage Soviet airbases while ground
troops in western Germany would attempt a breakthrough to reach encircled
Berlin. This plan was ultimately rejected by Clay.
With time running,
out Clay authorized the use of Berlin's airways to undermine the Soviet
blockade. This was a move that the Soviets had not counted on. On 30 November
1945, the Allies had recieved in writing the approval for free access to Berlin
via three twenty three mile wide air corridors. Further undermining the Soviet
blockade, the usage of cargo aircraft could not justify the Soviets identifying
them as posing a military threat to its forces in eastern Germany and thus put
them in a very delicate position when the aircraft refused to turn back of
either engaging and shooting them down or backing down. Shooting down unarmed
humanitarian aircraft would put the Soviets in violation of their own
agreements and cause a political uproar and backlash against the Soviet Union
that it would not want. Clay initially approached LeMay with an inquiry
regarding whether or not his aircraft could move amounts of coal to support the
operations of the city. LeMay promptly responded that his planes could carry
anything required. When they approached the British forces, it was confirmed
that the British had already been conducting their own airlift in support of
British forces in Berlin.
During the 'Little
Air Lift' British military planner Air Commodore Reginald Waite made
calculations towards the resources required for supporting the entire populace
of the city. His calculations equated to a requirement of seventeen hundred
calories per person per day, in the form of 646 tons of flour and wheat, 125
tons of cereal, 64 tons of fat, 109 tons of meat and fish, 180 tons of
dehydrated potatoes, 180 tons of sugar, 11 tons of coffee, 19 tons of powdered
milk, 5 tons of whole milk for children, 3 tons of fresh yeast for baking, 144
tons of dehydrated vegetables, 38 tons of salt and 10 tons of cheese to support
the population of Berlin. In conclusion nearly 1,534 tons were needed daily to
keep the over two million inhabitants of the encircled city alive. Additionally
beyond the food needs, West Berlin needed to be kept heated and powered, which
would require another 3,475 tons of coal and gasoline to be flown in.
Initially ill
prepared in comparison to the British, the Americans began organizing the
positioning of planes to support the operation. The entire thing would get the
final green light when General Albert Wedemeyer, US Army Chief of Plans and
Operations visited Europe and endorsed the operation. Wedemeyer had overseen
the largest airlift of the Second World War when American aircraft flew from
bases in India, over the Hump in the Himalayas to China in the war against
Japan. The ensuing operation would be dubbed 'Operation Vittles' by the
Americans, 'Operation Plainfare' by the British and 'Operation Pelican' by the
Australians when they committed additional airlift capailities in September
1948. On 24 June 1948 General LeMay appointed Brigadier General Joseph Smith,
then the headquarters commandant for USAFE at Camp Lindsey, to serve as the
Provisional Task Force Commander of the airlift operation. On 25 June 1948 Clay gave the order to launch
Operation Vittles. The next day a force of 32 Douglas C-47 Skytrains lifted off
for Berlin hauling 80 tons of cargo, including milk, flour, and medicine. The
first British Royal Air Force aircraft lifted off headed for Berlin on 28 June.
At that time, the airlift was expected to last for only a duration of three
weeks.
By 1 July, the system
was set into motion with C-47s and Douglas C-54 Skymasters arriving in mass at
Rhein Main Air Base. Rhein Main would serve as a solely C-54 base with
Wiesbaden operating a mixture of C-47s and C-54s. The aircraft would fly
northeast and enter West Berlin through southern air corridor designated the
American corridor and land at Tempelhof Airport, offload their supplies then
exit through the central air corridor designated the British corridor. Upon
reaching the British zone of occupation, the aircraft would then turn south and
return to their respective bases. The British Royal Air Force operated a
similar resupply system, flying southeast from several airports in the Hamburg
area through their assigned corridor into RAF Gatow in the British Sector, and
then also returning out on the central corridor. They would then turn for home
or land at Hanover depending on the circumstance. Unlike the Americans, the
British also ran several round trip operations using their southeastern
corridor. On 6 July, RAF Avro York and Douglas Dakotas (the Dakota was the
British designation for the C-47 Skytrain) were joined by Short Sunderland
flying boats of the Royal Navy. Flying boats operated from Finkenwerder on the
Elbe River near Hamburg, flying to the Havel River adjacent to RAF Gatow. The
corrosion resistant hull of the Sunderlands better suited them to the
particular task of delivering baking powder and other salt products to the
city.
A maintenance system
was soon coordinated to accommodate the large number of flights. Crews would
work three eight hour shifts rotating between C-54s and C-47s. Aircraft were
scheduled to take off at an interval of every four minutes, staggered at an altitude
of 1,000 feet higher than the preceding aircraft. The initial aircraft would
operate at a height of 5,000 feet and each aircraft adding an additional 1,000
feet for each of five aircraft before the sixth aircraft would return to a
5,000 foot operational profile. The first week of the airlift saw an average of
only 90 tons of supplies per day reaching West Berlin, this number would
increase to nearly 1,000 tons per day by the end of the second week. Soviet
authorities in the East ridiculed the operation declaring it a futile attempt
to save face against the superior Soviet authority.
On 28 July 1948,
Major General William H, Tunner arrived at Wiesbaden Airbase to take command of
the airlift operation. Having also had experience with the airlift operation in
the China-Burma-India campaign, he set about to reorganize the entire
operation. On 13 August 1948 a C-54 crashed at Tempelhof and burst into flames
at the end of the runway and a second C-54 landing behind it burst the tires of
its landing gear trying to avoid the wreckage. A third Skymaster made a ground
loop maneuver on an auxiliary runway and Tempelhof was closed when the control
tower lost control of the situation, a move that greatly embarrassed Tunner.
Although no one was killed in the crashes, the incident became known as 'Black
Friday'. As a result of the Black Friday crash, Tunner ordered that
Instrumental Flight Rules be in effect at all times regardless of visibility.
In addition to this he instituted a policy that each aircraft would only have
one chance to land at the airport, any aborted landing would result in the
aircraft returning to its base in western Germany. Sighting easier convenience
for loading and unloading of aircraft, Tunner soon made the decision to replace
all C-47s with C-54s or larger aircraft.
Pilots were forbidden
to leave their aircraft for any reason while on the ground in Berlin and
military jeeps were converted into mobile snack bars often staffed with German
women to distribute refreshments to the crews while they remained at their
aircraft. Clearance documents and flight information were given to the pilots
while they snacked. As a result of this method, the time on ground from the
shutdown of engines on the ramp, unloading and turn around before heading back
to Wiesbaden or Rhein Main was set at only thirty minutes. Operating profiles
were later also adjusted with flights launching every three minutes instead of
four with 500 foot separation rather than 1000, stacked in altitude from 4,000
to 6,000 feet operating altitude. Maintenance was strictly emphasized and given
the highest priority to maximize turn around time to implement a goal of 1440
landings in West Berlin each day. This figure would mean, an aircraft would be
landing in West Berlin for every minute there was in a day. The Germans
countered the problem of manpower, with Berliners serving as unloaders and
airfield repair crews, a task which was rewarded with additional rations. As
the crews began to improve their execution of duty, unload times dropped dramatically
and a record was set first when an entire 10 ton shipment of coal was offloaded
from a C-54 in a span of ten minutes and then later a twelve man crew unloaded
another 10 ton shipment from a C-54 in five minutes and forty five seconds.
After only a month of
operations, daily flight operations flew more than 1,500 flights each day and
delivered more than 4,500 tons of cargo, enough to keep West Berlin
sufficiently supplied. Supply shipments improved to a rate of 5,000 tons a day.
One of the most memorable
moments of the Berlin Airlift was known as 'Operation Little Vittles' this
occurred when Colonel Gail Halvorsen used his off time to fly into Berlin and
shot a series of home movies with a handheld camera. One day upon encountering
a group of German children he introduced himself and he handed out two sticks
of Wrigley's Doublemint gum and promised that if the children did not fight
over the gum, he would bring more when he returned to Berlin. As he left, the
German children divided up the gum as best they could and inquired as to how
they would know that it was him when he returned. His reply was that he would
wiggle his wings. The following day on his approach to Berlin, he put inputs
into the controls which rocked the aircraft and he dropped chocolate bars
attached to hankerchief parachutes to the children below. Everyday the number
of children would increase and so to did his airdrops. Soon Base Ops at
Tempelhof began receiving stacks of mail addressed to 'Uncle Wiggly Wings',
'The Chocolate Uncle' and the 'Chocolate Flier'. Initially Halvorsen's exploits
were met with dissatisfaction from his commanding officer but ultimately the
gesture was approved of by General Tunner who designated the mission as
'Operation Little Vittles' adding additional airplanes and pilots to
Halvorsen's venture. When news of Operation Little Vittles reached the United
States, children across th country enthusiastically donated candy of their own
to be dropped to the German children. Some children even participated by attaching
parachutes to the candies that would be dropped over Berlin. Soon, major
manufacturers nationwide became involved. In the end, over three tons of candy
were dropped on West Berlin, and the "operation" was designated as a
success. The candy dropping aircraft were christened 'Raisin Bombers" or
"Candy Bombers" by the German children.
In response to the
mounting airlift operation, the Soviets first countered by offering free food
to anyone who crossed into East Berlin and registered their ration cards with
the Soviet authorities. The Soviet move was ultimately rejected by West
Berliners. The Soviets then ramped up their propaganda campaign against the
people of West Berlin utilizing psychological warfare and declaring that all of
Berlin fell under Soviet authority. They further declared that it was only a
matter of time before the Western allies abandoned the city and the populous of
West Berlin. As further measures, Soviet and German communist harassed
democratically elected officials from West Berlin that had to conduct its
business in the city hall which was located in the Soviet sector of the city.
In an effort to harass the airlift itself, the Soviets often attempted to
impede on the arrival of inbound aircraft by varying means including buzzing transports
with Soviet fighters, scheduling parachute jumps in the paths of the air
corridors and using searchlights to disorient pilots flying at night. Try as
they may, none of the Soviet measures were effective in hampering the
operation.
By the onset of winter,
estimates for amounts needed to sustain the population in winter were adjusted
and the transportation force was enhanced when the Royal Air Force added larger
Handley Page Hasting transports to their available fleet. To accommodate for
winter operations, Tunner hired a force of majorily former Luftwaffe ground
crews to maintain the airfields. Due to weight restrictions imposed on the
airfields at RAF Gatow and Tempelhof Airport, and the stresses put upon them by
the rotations of C-54s, a 6,000 foot asphalt runway was constructed at
Tempelhof to better accommodate the air fleet. The French although entangled in
the Indochina War supplied several aging Junkers Ju-52 transports to supply its
personnel in Berlin. French aircraft flew into Tegel on the shores of Lake
Tegel. There was one problem with this, the approach to Tegel Airfield was
hampered by the placement of a Soviet radio tower in proximity to the airfield.
After the Soviets refused to remove the tower, French General Jean Ganeval
ordered that the tower be demolished and on 16 December 1948, the tower was
blown up much to the delight of the Berliners. The destruction of the radio
tower would spark widespread protest from the Soviets. When General Ganeval's
Soviet counterpart General Alexej Kotikow, asked him angrily by phone how he
could have committed such an act, Ganeval is said to have replied laconically,
"With dynamite, my dear colleague."
To improve control
over the air traffic entering and exiting Berlin, the newly developed Ground
Controlled Approach radar system was sent to Europe and installed at both
Tempelhof and Fassberg in the British
Zone in West Germany, a measure which guaranteed operations in all weather
conditions. Soon the only hinderance on flight operations would prove to be the
weather itself. The months of November and December 1948 were the worst of the
entire operation. On many occasions aircraft would fly to Berlin only to be met
with a thick layer of fog which prevented landing and they were forced to
return to West Germany. On one occasion on 20 November 1948, forty two aircraft
departed for West Berlin, but only one managed to there. At one point, West
Berlin only had enough coal for one week of operation. The shortage was made up
for ultimately when weather conditions improved and more than 171,000 tons of
supplies were delivered in January 1949, followed by 152,000 tons in February,
and 196,223 tons in March.
By April 1949,
General Tunner declared that he wanted to do something big to boost the morale
of everyone involved in the operation. On Easter Sunday, he set to break all
records and he would do so by only hauling coal thus in preparation for this
coal was stockpiled for the effort. By the time it was completed, 12,941 tons
of coal had been delivered in 1,383 flights to West Berlin, without a single
accident. A welcome side effect of the effort was that operations in general
were boosted, and tonnage increased from 6,729 tons to 8,893 tons per day in
the days following the Easter operation. In total, the airlift delivered
234,476 tons in April of 1949. On 21 April, it was recorded that the tonnage of
supplies flown into the city exceeded amounts that were previously brought into
the city by rail.
The Airlift operation
proved an embarrassment to the Soviets and the Easter operation was the nail in
the coffin. On 15 April 1949, the Soviets announced that they were willing to
lift the blockade of Berlin. After a series of negotiations on 4 May 1949, the
Allies reached an agreement which would end the Blockade in an eight day
period. The Soviets relented and removed their blockade of Berlin at 12:01 on
the morning of 12 May 1949. The British drove a convoy through Berlin as a
symbol of the victory of the airlift and the first train from West Germany
arrived in West Berlin at 5:32am. Celebrations erupted across West Berlin to
commemorate the lifting of the Blockade. Flights however would continue into
Berlin to build up a surplus of supplies in case the Soviets tried to blockade
the city again in the future. By 24 July 1949, three months worth of supplies
had been stockpiled at facilities in West Berlin, ensuring that there was ample
time to restart the Airlift if it were required. The Berlin Airlift officially
came to an end on 30 September 1949, after fifteen months of continued air
operation. In total the United States delivered 1,783,573 tons and the United
Kingdom 541,937 tons, totaling 2,326,406 tons, nearly two-thirds of which was
coal, on some 278,228 flights to airfields in West Berlin.
The Royal Australian
Air Force bolsted this number further with the
delivery of 7,968 tonnes of freight and 6,964 passengers while flying
2,062 sorties. The force of C-47s and C-54s together flew over 92 million miles
during the operation, almost the distance from Earth to the Sun. At the height
of the Berlin Airlift, one plane was landing at an airfield in West Berlin
every thirty seconds. The cost of the Airlift was 101 fatalities including 40
Britons and 31 Americans, mostly due to crashes. Seventeen American and eight
British aircraft crashed during the duration of the operation. Financial
responsibility of the Airlift was shared between the United States, United
Kingdom, and West Germany. Some 692 transport aircraft were engaged in the
Berlin Airlift, of which more than 100 were operated by civilian aviation
entities.
In 1974 Colonel Gail
Halvorsen, the original 'Candy Bomber' was decorated with the Großes
Bundesverdienstkreuz 'Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic
of Germany', one of Germany's highest medals for his actions during the Berlin
Airlift.
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